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1. Introduction 
During the last two decades, vertical disintegration in most industries and the globalization of 
intermediate goods’ markets has led to significant changes in the pattern of international division of 
labour among manufacturing firms. These developments, together with other factors (primarily 
increased competition from low cost producers and exchange rate constraints preluding the 
introduction of a single currency) have had huge consequences for the mature industrial systems in 
European countries, including Italy. The peculiar features of Italian industry, i.e. small average size 
of firms, specialization in traditional industries, the “industrial district model” characterizing the 
Centre-North regions, the historical backwardness of firms in the South (the less developed part of 
Italy), are all characteristics that add to the problems involved and in the second half of the 1990s 
result in a serious productivity slowdown and significant reductions in export and market shares. 
This paper deals with the Italian manufacturing industry, with a particular focus on subcontracting 
firms, i.e. firms mostly supplying intermediate products to order (specific components and services 
and more complex inputs), which represent a significant portion of Italy’s manufacturing sector. 
What are the effects of changes in the international division of labour on the performance 
and growth of subcontracting firms? How can subcontracting firms successfully enter the global 
value chain? The answers to these questions are far from straightforward. Our working hypothesis 
is that the reorganization of the division of labour, in the most dynamic suppliers may have induced 
a change in the “nature of subcontracting”: from being captive suppliers, whose activities were 
conducted in a monopsonistic context, the best subcontracting firms are urged to transform 
themselves into agents within a trans-national productive network, and enter into complementary 
rather than subordinate relationships with buyers. For these firms, globalization provides the chance 
to evolve and progress from being local to becoming global suppliers. However, this evolution  
cannot be taken for granted. As scholars adhering to the Global Value Chain (henceforth GVC) 
approach maintain, it is the position and the upgrading (rather than simply the participation) in the 
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global value chain pursued through innovation that yield higher returns and better growth 
performance to subcontracting firms. This means that subcontractors involved in only the simplest 
traditional manufacturing activities remain the most exposed to the increasing global competition. 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between the division of labour and firm growth 
in the Italian manufacturing industry in the second half of the 1990s. The literature on firm growth 
is large, and dates back at least to Gibrat’s law of proportionate growth (MANSFIELD, 1962). The 
novelty of our approach is its focus on organizational choice as one of the key factors in growth. 
More specifically, in this paper we: a) try to understand whether and how subcontracting may affect 
the growth dynamics of firms; b) test whether growth could be due to stronger incentives to 
innovate for subcontracting firms keen to move up the value chain, which would be consistent with 
the predictions of the GVC approach; and c) study the joint influence of subcontracting and location 
on growth by testing whether the growth dynamics of Southern subcontractors in particular are 
significantly different from those of North and Centre subcontracting firms.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the major determinants of the 
globalization of the intermediate goods markets, the new pattern of international division of labour 
among industrial firms, and the difficulties experienced by Italian manufacturing industry firms to 
adapt to the modified scenario. Section 3 describes the possible interactions between positioning 
and upgrading along the global value chain and propensity for innovation, and firm growth. This 
section relies heavily on the suggestions of GVC scholars, according to which the firm’s position in 
the global value chain, its innovative behaviour, and the pattern of governance of the chain it feeds 
into, are crucial for determining its growth performance. Section 4 focuses on the empirical 
investigation and is organized in three subsections. The first presents the data and some descriptive 
statistics. We make use of the Capitalia survey of Italian manufacturing firms (for 1995-1997 and 
1998-2000), which provides valuable micro-level data on a stratified sample of about 5,000 firms 
with at least 11 employees. The second subsection describes the estimation methods, and the third 
subsection presents the main results. The explanatory variables for growth used in the econometric 
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investigation include age, size and past growth, variables commonly used in standard econometric 
investigations of firm growth, and organizational variables, such as subcontracting and product 
innovation, proposed in the GVC approach. We also include a geographic variable, “localization”, 
which is particularly relevant for the case of Italy, in order to detect possible differences in the 
growth of Southern and Centre-Northern firms. Section 5 presents the main conclusions from this 
investigation. 
 
2. The globalization of intermediates’ markets and the (late) involvement of Italian 
manufacturing industry 
The last two decades witnessed profound changes in the international division of labour among 
firms, which led to increasingly globalized intermediates markets.1 Outsourcing and offshoring2 of 
(stages of) production activities – mainly by (large) firms headquartered in developed countries – 
are major features of this evolution, for most industries resulting in global value chains.3 The 
reasons for these changes are several and all have been widely investigated. First, the substantial 
reductions in trade barriers, tariffs and transportation costs favour market integration through a 
reduction in the costs of temporary exports/imports, thus including developing countries in 
international production networks as low cost producers of intermediate inputs. Second, the 
development and diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) foster the 
spread of international outsourcing/subcontracting networks by: a) reducing the coordination costs 
among the agents in the network and making geographical proximity less of a constraint; and b) 
making the different tasks and activities that constitute the production process separable in time and 
space (MILGROM and ROBERTS, 1990; NORDÅS, 2004, 2005). Third, the disintegration of 
multinational enterprises (MNE) plays a substantial role (GEREFFI et al., 2005), as subcontractors 
from different countries are increasingly included in these firms international production networks,4 
a process described by SALIOLA and ZANFEI, 2009 as “the changing nature of multinational 
enterprises”.5 Although the involvement of independent suppliers differs across sectors and 
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countries, and is highly dependent on the absorptive capacity of contractors, MNE outsourcing to 
independent local firms seems to be increasing as shown by a wealth of evidence (e.g. NORDÅS, 
2005). The increasing recourse by MNEs to local networks allows to get greater bargaining power 
against national governments (IETTO-GILLES, 2002), better implementation of just-in-time 
production procedures (e.g. the automotive industry - STURGEON et al., 2008), and increased 
competitiveness through outsourcing to low cost suppliers (especially in the case of emerging 
countries; see HUMPHREY and MEMEDOVIC, 2003). Finally, improvements in the quality of 
contracting institutions induce producers increasingly to trust inter-firm market relationships 
(ANTRAS and HELPMAN, 2008) even in the presence of uncertainty, incomplete contracts and 
potential opportunistic behaviours, while repeated collaborations, reputation and careful “selection 
of players” help to reduce holdup costs and lock-in. Taken together, these factors make a spatial and 
functional reorganization of the division of labour even more valuable, increasing the opportunities 
for larger profits for both outsourcer and contractor. 
The globalization of intermediate inputs (and more generally of real and financial) markets, 
the harsher competitive pressures being exerted by Eastern European and Asian producers 
(especially China), the exchange rate constraints prior to the introduction of the single European 
currency, and the development and spread of ICT acted as powerful shocks on Italian 
manufacturing firms and led to slow downs in productivity and significantly reduced export and 
market shares in the second half of the 1990s.6  
The lack of an adequate and prompt response from Italy’s manufacturing sector to the 
challenges of globalization can be explained by the well known peculiarities of the industry. The 
historical structure of Italy’s manufacturing sector dominated by small sized firms becomes even 
more pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s, when a post-Fordist fragmentation of production 
combined with the rediscovery of the virtues of Marshallian industrial districts in the North-eastern 
and central parts of Italy (BECATTINI, 1978, 1979),7 result in district firms becoming the most 
powerful drivers (MENGHINELLO, 2004) of Italian manufacturing industry performance. The 
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competitive advantages of this organizational model are founded on: territorially bounded high 
division of labour among small and medium sized specialized firms; high degree of local economic 
dominance of a particular industry (local specialization especially in “made in Italy” merchandise 
and mechanical engineering); low transaction costs based on high levels of trust and cooperation 
among agents; locally embedded practical and tacit knowledge; pools of specialized labour. The 
system fosters the development of substantial Marshallian external economies - external to the firm, 
but internal to the district. 
Globalization comes as a major blow to this industrial district economy, and turned many 
traditional strengths into weaknesses. International, low-cost competition renders specialization in 
traditional goods no longer sustainable, while the Maastricht constraints inhibit “competitive 
devaluation” of the Lira, a solution often resorted to in previous decades. With the spread of ICT, 
codified and transmittable knowledge and information begin to supersede the tacit and informal 
knowledge in industrial district firms. Small size and poor endowments of human capital make 
adjustment to the new technological regime difficult for industrial districts’ firms8.  
Difficulties are even heavier for firms localised in Southern Italy. The South of Italy is 
characterized by a historical lag of local manufacturing firms in terms of performance, productivity, 
market penetration and international openness. Several investigations (GIANNOLA and 
SCALERA, 1998; GUERRIERI and IAMMARINO, 2001) unambiguously confirm the persistence 
in the mid 1990s of a substantial gap between South and Centre-North of Italy industry. In addition, 
Southern manufacturing appears to be more vertically integrated because of the higher transaction 
costs (GIUNTA and SCALERA, 2007) and thus less able to profit from reorganization of the 
domestic and international division of labour. 
Despite these difficulties, and with some delay, a share of Italian manufacturing firms  
manages to enter the global value chain. Large firms, usually assemblers/buyers located in the 
downstream sections of supply chains, start reducing their dependence on local suppliers by 
exploiting lower cost sources abroad and thus crowding out some Italian subcontractors. At the 
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same time, some small and medium sized firms move from subcontracting to direct sale in final 
markets or try to progress from local to global suppliers (CAMUFFO et al., 2007). In order to face 
the mounting commercial pressure from low labour-cost countries and achieve better positions in 
the international value chain, firms exit districts in search of lower costs and engage in international 
outsourcing – mainly in Central-Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean basin and South-
East Asia. International outsourcing has major consequences for borders of districts, which 
traditionally were highly impermeable (RULLANI, 1997). Even more important is that exits from 
districts change the nature of the division of labour among firms, which once was a major source of 
competitive advantage for industrial district firms. This explains the growing fear (CORÒ and 
GRANDINETTI, 1999; BRUSCO et al., 1997) that international outsourcing may result in loss of 
local skills and technological spillovers, leading to the “dissolution” of industrial district external 
economies. 
While general industry statistics do not capture the intensity of this phenomenon, a number 
of case studies (e.g. TATTARA et al., 2006) and more systematic investigations (COSTA and 
FERRI, 2007; DAVERI and JONA-LASINIO, 2007; FALZONI and TAJOLI, 2008) provide 
evidence of the increasing involvement of Italian firms in the global value chain. However, this 
process involves the Mezzogiorno only marginally.9 The UNIONCAMERE 2006 report states that 
in the mid 2000s some 77% of medium sized firms had at least one foreign subcontractor. But, 
while a fairly large number of firms (over 65% in 2000) in the Northern, Central and Eastern 
regions of the country make use of subcontractors outside the region and/or abroad, in Southern 
Italy the subcontracting network is organized mainly on a local basis, with about 2/3 of firms 
relying on provincial suppliers. From the point of view of subcontractors, this implies that in most 
cases suppliers located in the Mezzogiorno serve only a few customers in local markets, are in 
peripheral and weak positions in the value chain, are involved in the least profitable stages of 
production and have little bargaining power with clients. According to the few studies on this topic 
(e.g. CAMUFFO et al., 2007), Centre-North firms differ in that they exploit the chances offered by 
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the international division of labour to reinforce their roles as specialized suppliers, while market 
globalization provides a strong incentive for their being more open to international markets and 
more active innovators. Although they may not be leaders, these firms occupy more secure and 
more lucrative positions in the value chain; they frequently couple subcontracting activity with 
production for final markets, and perform the roles of both outsourcer and subcontractor, acting as 
the knot joining the parts of the complex value chain network. In this paper, we investigate (Section 
4) whether these kinds of firms still have gaps in their productivity or growth with respect to non-
subcontracting firms, or whether their participation and role in the global value chain allow them to 
record productivity and growth performance that is equal to or even greater than that of other firms. 
 
3. Global value chain and firm growth: the role of product innovation  
In a global scenario, as decomposition of the production process increases, commissioning firms  
abandon or reduce their presence at the core of manufacturing production to focus on more 
profitable activities (design, engineering, marketing). Consequently, the markets for intermediate 
goods get thicker, hold-up costs diminish, and suppliers can benefit from more intensive 
specialization (MCLAREN, 2000). The nature of subcontracting activities evolves, and more 
qualified and more specialized suppliers of intermediates emerge to serve not a single monopsonist 
but rather many final firms within a network of complementary relationships. Subcontracting firms 
are directly involved in more activities designed to offer differentiated, innovative products and 
services to a wider array of customers and to becoming more autonomous in the global arena. Thus, 
firms occupying the positions of subcontractors in the global value chain are faced with increasingly 
complex tasks, including the governance and policy related to their own supply networks.  
The theoretical and empirical literature discusses the features and effects of outsourcing and 
offshoring for firms’ productivity at some length10 (see, e.g., OLSEN, 2006; AMITI and WEI, 
2006; GÖRG et al., 2008); however, the other side of the coin, i.e. the impact of being a 
subcontracting firm on firm performance, has been rather overlooked. A few exceptions are 
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KIMURA, 2002 and RAZZOLINI and VANNONI, 2008, which deal respectively with Japanese 
and Italian industrial firms. Kimura concludes that subcontractors’ profits are not higher than those 
of other firms, while Razzolini and Vannoni find that the total factor productivity of subcontractors 
exporting to foreign markets is lower compared to direct exporters. In both studies, that particular 
organizational choice seems to be subject to a “subcontracting discount” . 
In both studies cited above, there is no consideration of the link between the firm’s 
organizational choice (i.e. being a subcontracting firm or selling directly to final markets) and the 
propensity to innovate, a link that may be crucial for at least two reasons. One originates in the 
relation between the effects of successful innovation on the firm’s rate of growth, which based on 
MANSFIELD, 1962 seminal contribution, became a very popular and variously tested issue 
(GEROSKI et al., 1997, DEL MONTE and PAPAGNI, 2003; LOOF and HESHMATT, 2006). The 
second is related to the firm’s participation in the global chain, which provides opportunities for the 
development of a set of innovative subcontracting firms. This aspect constitutes the main focus of 
GVC, first proposed by GEREFFI, 1994 and developed in a number of contributions, such as 
GEREFFI and KORZENIEWICZ, 1994, KAPLINSKY, 2000,11 HENDERSON et al., 2002 and 
HUMPHREY and SCHMITZ, 2002.  
According to the GVC approach, the positioning of a firm and its upgrading along the global 
value chain, as well as the pattern of governance of the chain it feeds into,12 are crucial for 
determining its growth performance. GEREFFI, 1999 outlines a distinction between two types of 
production chains: a buyer driven commodity chain - common among labour intensive industries 
such as textiles and shoes - and a producer driven commodity chain - typical of industries such as 
automotive, electronics and civil aviation. In both chains, the key players directly carry out only the 
most innovation-intensive, highest return activities, both upward (design, engineering) and 
downward (marketing, retail). These activities yield high rents, while the simplest traditional 
manufacturing activities are the ones most exposed to increasing global competition. This view 
helps to explain some recent empirical evidence (TATTARA et al., 2006) for Italy, i.e. how the 
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harsh competition in the textile and footwear sectors that occurred in the 1990s was selective in not 
negatively affecting the most dynamic small and medium sized subcontractors, but forcing many 
marginal producers to exit the market. 
With regard to growth paths, the GVC identifies four, not mutually exclusive paths of 
expansion for subcontracting firms:  
a) increasing their x-efficiency;  
b) strengthening inter-firm connections with partners to build a more consistent and 
cooperative network than those of rivals;  
c) improving the quality of their functions along the chain, or moving to higher quality 
functions (e.g. from production to design); 
d) introducing new products or widening the range of products offered.  
While a) and b) seem to be essential requirements for participation in the value chain, but do 
not warrant per se upgrading in the value chain or ensure against the risk of a future decline, 
strategies c) and d) are key to higher returns and growth. In relation to innovation in particular, 
GEREFFI, 1999 points out that the motivation for product innovation primarily comes from foreign 
buyers and global assemblers, the key players in the global value chain, who push subcontracting 
firms to meet their demands for more value added and more sophisticated products. Along these 
lines, several empirical studies (e.g. DOLAN and HUMPHREY, 2000; BAIR and GEREFFI, 2001; 
BAZAN and NAVAS-ALEMAN, 2004; GIULIANI et al., 2005) find that integration in global 
value chains provides significant stimulus for product innovation - especially for firms most able to 
meet foreign buyers’ and global assemblers’ demands.  
Regarding the Italian experience, the GVC provides a rationale for the functional upgrading 
of many subcontracting firms located in the Northern and Central regions of Italy (see, e.g., 
AMIGHINI and RABELLOTTI, 2003 for the Veneto region, and CORÒ and GRANDINETTI, 
1999 for the Marche region), or even to changes in the specialization of some industrial district 
firms, moving from the production of final consumption commodities to the manufacture of 
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machinery and equipment employed in those same industries (DE ARCANGELIS and FERRI, 
2005). HUMPHREY and SCHMITZ, 2002 would refer to this activity as inter-sectoral upgrading. 
The major shortcomings of this fruitful line of analysis are that the results are usually based 
on case studies and/or anecdotal evidence, rather than on rigorous statistical methods, and reliable 
data are scarce. The investigation in the next section is intended to overcome some of these 
problems. Although our data do not allow us to test more broadly the ability of functional or inter-
sectoral upgrading to explain subcontracting firms’ growth, they do permit us to focus on the role of 
product innovation as a determinant of their growth in the value chain. 
 
4. The empirical investigation 
The empirical investigation has three main objectives. First, we study the relationship between 
subcontracting and firm growth (relative increases in sales or employees). Our working hypothesis 
is that subcontracting firms, when emancipated from their traditional inferior position with respect 
to the customer, may perform comparably to or even better than other firms. This idea is consistent 
with the considerations discussed above and with empirical investigations that provide evidence of 
significant positive relationships between subcontracting and respectively survival rates 
(MAZZOLA and BRUNI, 2000), rates of return ROE and ROI (INNOCENTI, 2003) or input 
productivity and returns (GIUNTA and SCALERA, 2007, for Central and Northern Italy firms).13 
Second, we test whether growth by subcontracting firms is based on the ability to innovate and 
upgrade in the value chain, consistent with the predictions of GVC theory. Third we evaluate 
possible geographic differences in the relationship between subcontracting and growth. 
Alongside these main objectives we test for the relevance of the neutrality result or “Gibrat’s 
law of proportionate growth”. According to this law, firm growth rate is stochastic and, therefore, 
independent of size, uncorrelated to past growth and not linked to other explanatory variables. 
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on Gibrat’s law, at least since MANSFIELD, 
1962. From the theoretical work, the most relevant criticism comes from models of firm learning 
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inspired by the seminal work of JOVANOVIC, 1982, that shows a negative relationship between 
the rate of firm growth, and age. Other contributions, such as SUTTON, 1997 and HART, 2000, 
refute the hypothesis of no serial correlation in growth rate by showing the strong persistence of 
growth. There are several other empirical studies along the same lines. EVANS, 1987a, 1987b for 
the US, and DUNNE and HUGHES, 1994 and VARIYAM and KRAYBILL, 1992 for the UK, 
show that there is a clear inverse relationship between growth rate and size and/or age for 
manufacturing and primary sector and services firms. These results are confirmed substantially by 
AUDRETSCH et al., 1997, 1999 for Dutch firms operating in different industrial sectors, and 
wholesale trade, by HARHOFF et al., 1998, who consider a sample of German firms, by 
MACPHERSON, 1996 for South Africa, and by YASUDA, 2005, who shows the existence of a 
strong negative correlation between growth rate and age or initial size for a sample of 14,000 
Japanese manufacturing firms. 
 
4.1. The data 
Before proceeding to the econometric analysis, we highlight some features of our data and provide a 
short descriptive analysis of the growth performance for our sample firms. Our investigation is 
based on a unique dataset made available by the seventh and eighth waves of the Capitalia “Survey 
on manufacturing firms”, which is carried out every three years.14 Capitalia collects data on a large 
number of variables from a stratified representative sample of around 5,000 Italian manufacturing 
firms with at least 11 employees. The seventh wave, covering the period 1995-1997, has 4,497 
observations; the eighth wave (1998-2000 period) consists of 4,680 observations, with 1,299 firms 
sampled in both waves. The sample includes the whole population of large firms (at least 500 
employees), while for the 11 to 499 employees class, the firms included in the sample represent, in 
terms of employment, about 12% of the population. The detailed questionnaire that is administered 
to all the firms asks about the values of a large number of organizational, structural and 
performance variables for the current year and in some cases for the previous one or two years. For 
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example, there is a question about intensity of subcontracting in the current year in terms of amount 
of sales to orders divided by overall sales. Also, each firm surveyed provides a 10 year time series 
for a selected number of balance sheet variables, which do not include additional information about 
subcontracting. Capitalia does not release information about non-responding firms. 
Tables 1 and 2 (A panels) show the firm size distributions for classes of employees and real 
sales (billion Liras at year 2000 values); the B panels record annual average growth rates for 
employees and real sales for 1995-1997 and 1998-2000. Both tables provide separate information 
for: 
a) Centre-North and Mezzogiorno firms; 
b) non-subcontractors (NOSUB, firms producing exclusively for direct sale); weak subcontractors 
(LOSUB, i.e. up to 50% of total sales are for orders); strong subcontractors (HISUB, i.e. more than 
50% of total sales are for orders); and absolute subcontractors (ONSUB, i.e. firms producing only to 
order); 
c) five size classes (i.e. according to the conventional European standard classification, 11-50, 51-
100, 101-250, 251-500 and over 500 employees). 
[Table 1 here] 
[Table 2 here] 
 Reflecting the population size distribution of Italian manufacturing firms, our sample 
includes a large number of small firms. Table 1, panel A shows that over 70% of firms employ up 
to 50 workers, but only 8.6% have more than 250 employees. In terms of annual sales (Table 2, 
panel A), 56% of the sample have revenues of less than 10 billions Liras (around €5.16 million) and 
88% have revenues of less than 50 billions Liras (€25.8 million). The majority of firms (about 86%) 
in the sample are in the Central and Northern regions of Italy with medium-large firms (more than 
250 employees) making up 9.2% of the sample in the Centre-North and 4.6% in Southern Italy. The 
smallest firms (less than 50 employees) are more often subcontractors - in 41.4% are exclusive 
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subcontractors, while 39.2% never do subcontracting work. The corresponding shares for other 
firms are 24.9% (ONSUB) and 55.5% (NOSUB). 
 The B panels show that, with one exception, the sampled firms are characterized by positive 
(and in some cases fairly high) average growth rates. There does not seem to be a clear relationship 
between growth rates and firm size at this stage. In terms of geographic differences, Centre-North 
firms show higher growth rates of employees and sales, with the exception of non-subcontractors 
(NOSUB) and weak subcontractors (LOSUB). Focusing in more detail on the relationship between 
subcontracting intensity and growth, the evidence is mixed. To assess the statistical significance of 
differences among groups, we performed ANOVA tests (Table 3) on the differences, which in most 
cases are statistically significant. In brief, the ONSUB and HISUB groups show the highest growth 
rates in real sales (but not employees). More interesting is that, in almost all cases, each of the 
middle groups (LOSUB and HISUB) show higher growth rates of sales and employees than the 
extreme groups (NOSUB and ONSUB). This raises the possibility of a non-monotonic (i.e. 
increasing and then decreasing) relationship between growth rate and subcontracting intensity. The 
rows in Tables 1 and 2 show that this pattern applies to all firm sizes and to the overall group of 
firms in the Central and Northern regions. The exception is Southern firms where growth rates tend 
to decrease with subcontracting intensity.15 This result is confirmed by the econometric analysis; 
thus, possible interpretations are postponed to section 4.3. 
[Table 3 here] 
 
4.2. The estimation method 
We estimate the following three equations for growth in terms of both real sales and employees. 
itititititititititit uINPICTAVKSUBSUDAGEyyy +++++++∆++=∆ −− 3212131211 βββγγθθθα ,        (1) 
itit
ititititititititit
uIXS
INPICTAVKSUBSUDAGEyyy
++
+++++++∆++=∆ −−
4
3212131211
β
βββγγθθθα
   (2) 
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and 
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where i is the firm, t=1,2 the 1998 or 2001 survey, ity  is the log of real sales SAL or the log of the 
number of employees EMP; AGE is the log of firm age (years); SOU is a dummy taking the value 1 
if the firm is localized in the Southern region; SUB is subcontracting intensity; and AVK (the ratio 
of added value over capital) is a typical indicator of productivity. ICT and INP are two dummies, 
which we consider proxies for the firm’s attitude to innovation; they take the value 1 if during the 
last three years the firm has respectively carried out ICT investments and introduced product 
innovation. The exact definition of these variables and the main descriptive statistics are reported in 
Table 4. Finally, ity∆  is the first difference 1−− itit yy . A possible significance of parameter θ 
indicates the dependence of growth rates on the initial value 1−ity , while significance of θ2 would 
imply growth persistence. According to Gibrat’s law, both these parameters should not be 
significantly different from zero. 
[Table 4 here] 
The interaction terms IXS and SXS respectively are the products of INP and SUB and SOU 
and SUB. IXS is introduced to assess the impact of innovation on the sensitivity of growth to 
subcontracting intensity. As shown above, within the set of subcontractors, GVC theory 
distinguishes a group of innovative firms able to upgrade along the value chain and to grow more 
than other firms. This means that the subcontracting firm should benefit substantially from 
innovation as it allows achievement of a better position in the value chain. For this reason, the 
expected sign of the IXS parameter is positive. Specification (2) allows us to make separate 
evaluations of the marginal effect of innovation on growth for non-subcontractors (the parameter 
3β ) and for absolute subcontractors (the sum 43 ββ + ). 
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The product SXS and the squared term in equation (3) test the hypotheses that the 
relationship between subcontracting intensity and firm growth is: a) structurally different for the 
South and the Centre-North; and b) non-linear. From (3), we can show easily that the marginal 
effect of subcontracting on growth rate is SUB32 2γγ +  for Centre-North and 
SUB)(2 5342 γγγγ +++  for Mezzogiorno. This means we can test the hypothesis of geographical 
structural differences in the relationship between subcontracting and growth by checking the 
statistical significance of 4γ  and 5γ , which, in turn, correspond to the differences )( CNS 22 γγ −  and 
)( CNS 33 γγ − , where S and CN respectively denote the parameters of the regressions on the 
subsamples relative to Southern and Centre-Northern firms. We can test for non-linearity by 
considering the statistical significance of 3γ  and 5γ . Finally, in equation (3), the marginal effect of 
localization (i.e. the difference in average growth between South and Centre-North) is equal to 
2
541 2 SUBSUB γγγ ++ . Using specification (3), we can run regressions on the whole sample, 
without the need for separate estimates for the two subsamples. 
Concerning the estimation method, our choices are strongly constrained by the nature of 
available data. In particular, since firms are requested to indicate the value of subcontracting 
intensity for one year only, our data seem more suited to pool than to panel treatment, for at least 
two reasons. First, the number of firms sampled in both waves of the survey is just slightly more 
than 25% of cases, which would make a panel strongly unbalanced with a minor informational 
advantage with respect to pooled data, or alternatively would exclude many observations (almost all 
observations of Southern firms). Second, and more important, a panel would not allow (at least in a 
fixed effects specification) the use of the time invariant dummy variable SOU, which, in our 
analysis, is crucial. 
The likely endogeneity of the variable SUB advises to consider GIV estimates since OLS 
are possibly affected by inconsistency. The unavailability of lagged data on subcontracting 
introduces the problem of appropriate instruments. We chose some other variables drawn from the 
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Capitalia survey, i.e. ROI, AVL (the ratio added value/employed) and HUM (an indicator of human 
capital as measured by the share of workers with a secondary schooling) as instruments. These 
variables show relatively high correlation coefficients with SUB (not less than 0.40).16 Also, this set 
of instruments allows not to reject the hypothesis that over identification constraints hold. 
 
4.3. The results 
Tables 5 and 6 respectively, present the results of the OLS and GIV estimations of equations (1), (2) 
and (3), for the growth rates in real sales and employees. Concerning the dependence of growth 
rates on the initial values of real sales and employed, the econometric investigation shows that in all 
cases, growth rates are negatively related to the initial value with a significance level not lower than 
5%. Theoretical growth rates are considerable for the lowest size (growth rate for employees is 
higher than 30% for firms with 11 employees), but much lower as firm size increases (17% for 31 
employees, 9% for 51 employees and 4% for 100 employees). Estimates of parameter θ2 indicate 
negative statistically significant growth persistence only for employees (not for real sales), which is 
in line with the literature on Italy (CONTINI and REVELLI, 1989). The overall conclusion is that 
the results of Tables 5 and 6 support the findings in most of literature on empirical lack of validity 
for Gibrat’s law. 
[Table 5 here] 
[Table 6 here] 
Control variables AGE, AVK, ICT and INP in almost all cases show a relationship with 
growth rates that is consistent with the theoretical predictions. In particular, the regressions confirm 
that firm age negatively affects the propensity to grow (but the link is statistically significant only 
for sales), while capital productivity, attitude to innovation and propensity to invest in ICT in most 
cases have a positive impact on growth rates. This latter result, although theoretically not surprising, 
is important since it contradicts many of the findings in the literature (e.g. DEL MONTE and 
PAPAGNI, 2003; OLIVEIRA and FORTUNATO, 2006). 
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Moving on to the results that are connected more closely to subcontracting, we notice that in 
the estimation of equation (1) neither subcontracting intensity not geographic location have a 
statistically significant effect on firm growth. In equation (2) the estimated parameters of the control 
variables are almost unaltered with the exception of age, which loses significance in three out of 
four cases. More important is that the introduction of the interaction factor IXS between INP and 
SUB confirms that, on the one hand, innovation is crucial for growth for subcontractors and on the 
other hand, an increase in subcontracting intensity leads to higher growth in innovating firms. These 
results are obtained simply by noting that the estimated coefficient of the variable IXS 4β  is 
positive and statistically significant (slightly above 5% for employee growth), while both 3β  and 
2γ  are not significantly different from zero. Estimation of equation (2) shows that it is innovative 
subcontracting (rather than just subcontracting activity) that is positively related to growth, which is 
consistent with the view that product innovation and good positioning in the value chain are linked 
to growth. 
In the non-linear specification (3), the effect of subcontracting on growth is definitely 
greater. In this case, the parameters of the control variables are substantially unaltered but the 
estimates of the γ parameters become statistically significant. In addition, the results show that there 
is strong geographic differentiation. The estimation of equation (3) suggests that location in the 
South negatively affects firms’ growth performance. Moreover, the relationship between 
subcontracting and growth varies over the geographic areas we consider. In the case of Centre-
North, the relation shows a reversed U-shape with the highest value around 51% of subcontracting 
intensity for both employees and real sales. The marginal effect at the average value for 
subcontracting is always positive, between 0.22 and 0.31 for sales growth (1% increase in 
subcontracting intensity involves about 0.25% increase in growth of real sales) and between 0.02 
and 1.35 for the growth in employees. The theoretical forecast of sales growth varies from -4% for 
non subcontractors, +18% for firms with a 51% ratio subcontracting/sales, and +3% for absolute 
subcontractors. For employee growth, the theoretical forecast varies from -9% for non-
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subcontractors and absolute subcontractors to +33% for intermediate subcontractors. The reverse U-
shaped relation does not hold for the Mezzogiorno, where the impact of subcontracting is always 
negative at any value for subcontracting. At average subcontracting intensity, the marginal effect is 
between -0.18 and -0.57 for sales growth and between -0.09 and -0.14 for employee growth. The 
theoretical forecasts for growth for both sales and employees are between +8% for non-
subcontracting firms and +1% for absolute subcontractors.  
To summarize, the estimation of equation (3) seems to confirm the indications of equation 
(2). In the advanced areas of Italy, subcontracting activities do not penalize growth. Conversely, 
selling a share of output to order does not have a negative effect, but rather is a successful 
organizational choice and a crucial positive determinant of growth. However, this result does not 
hold for Southern firms, most likely because the nature of subcontracting in that area is still 
relatively undeveloped and the firms involved in these activities are less productive.  
As a robustness check, we estimated equations (1), (2) and (3) using alternative proxies for 
firm productivity, return and attitude to innovation. Compared to the results presented in Tables 5 
and 6, these changes produce only minor effects on the coefficient estimates while the signs and 
intensity of the relationships between growth and subcontracting are not significantly affected.  
Thus, our econometric investigation allows us to draw the following main conclusions. First, 
in accordance with most of the literature, Gibrat’s law is rejected, as current growth rate does not 
seem to be independent of variables such as age, initial size and past growth rates. Second, 
subcontracting intensity turns out be a determinant of growth when coupled with the propensity to 
innovate: within the subsample of subcontracting firms, we can confirm that innovative firms grow 
faster. This finding seems to be consistent with the GVC view on the crucial nexus between product 
innovation, upgrading along the value chain, and firm growth. Third, the non-linear relationship 
identified between subcontracting and growth in the Centre-North regions highlights that an 
organizational mode not fully specialized in either subcontracting activities or direct sales may be 
optimal. This means that subcontracting cannot be considered a marginal choice for less productive 
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firms to access the market but rather should be seen as an avenue to growth. Finally, for Southern 
firms the relationship between subcontracting and growth is peculiarly monotonically decreasing, 
which hints at the possible different nature of subcontracting in this area which retains traditional 
traits and therefore is negatively related to growth. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
While a number of studies deal with the causes and effects of outsourcing, much less attention has 
been paid to subcontracting. This paper focuses on the role of subcontracting for explaining firm 
growth in Italy, in the second half of the 1990s, in the light of changes in the pattern of international 
division of labour. Starting from the intuitions of the GVC approach, our analysis emphasizes the 
incentives provided by positioning and upgrading along the global value chain for subcontracting 
firms to innovate in the search for higher returns and better growth performance. Unlike most 
contributions from GVC research, our work is based on an empirical investigation on almost 5,000 
Italian manufacturing firms rather than on case studies. The evidence provided supports our 
working hypothesis about a substantial change in the role and nature of subcontracting, the latter 
being not necessarily (only) a residual marketing mode but (also) a means to participate 
successfully in the value chain. Indeed, according to our results, in the globalized market, 
subcontractors with a strong propensity to innovate come out to be the firms most likely to 
experience growth.  
While the changes that have occurred affect the firms in all advanced countries, the case of 
Italy has some interesting peculiarities. We have argued that the emergence of firms able to enter 
global value chains has had detrimental effects in terms of crowding out many Italian suppliers, and 
the negative effects have been worst for Southern firms. Our findings confirm the deep dualism of 
the Italian industrial structure and show that Southern subcontractors grow less than other firms and 
less than Centre-North subcontractors. In the current international pattern of the division of labour, 
Southern subcontracting firms seem doomed to playing a marginal role and being exposed 
 20
increasingly to the risk to becoming losers in the competition with emerging countries. In the 
absence of effective industrial and regional policies, globalization is thus likely to worsen the divide 
between the Centre-North and the South of Italy. 
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1 Several studies provide evidence of this phenomenon, e.g. OECD, 2007; MARIN, 2006; HAVIK and MCMORROW, 
2006. In particular, HAVIK and MCMORROW estimate that between 1992 and 2000 the world average share of 
intermediate imports in total imports rose by some 4 percentage points, with increases of 6 percentage points for 
Europe, 3 for USA, 5 for South East Asia and 9 for China. JONES and KIERZKOWSKI, 1990 wrote a seminal piece on 
the emergence of a new trend in globalization, based on advances in the technologies of transportation and 
communication and the decomposition of the production process across borders. 
2 There are no clear cut definitions of outsourcing and offshoring (and their relative measures) in the literature; see 
OECD, 2007. In the present paper, outsourcing and offshoring respectively mean the relocation of activities outside the 
firm to an independent input supplier (subcontractor) and the relocation of activities to a different country within a 
structure belonging to the firm or external to the firm. 
3 The value chain is the set of activities involved in the production and sale of commodities. It is global/worldwide 
when activities are allocated across firms localized in several different countries. For a survey of industrial 
subcontracting networks, see SACCHETTI and SUGDEN, 2003. 
4 However, a substantial part of international vertical specialization among MNEs also takes place through these firms’ 
intra industry trade in intermediate inputs (BORGA and ZEILE, 2004). See also ANTRAS, 2003 who underlines that 
capital-intensive intermediate goods tend to be imported within the boundaries of multinational firms, and HANSON et 
al., 2003 who document equally impressive growth in trade within multinational firms. 
5 Worthwhile to mention here is the eclectic paradigm of international production by DUNNING, 1993. For a more 
recent appraisal of the OLI (Ownership, Location, International Advantage) theory in the light of the changing 
characteristics of MNE activity and of the global economic scenario, see DUNNING, 2001. The impact of multinational 
firms’ investments on local subcontracting networks is documented, e.g. by DRIES and SWINNEN, 2004.  
6 From 1994 to 2005, annual labour productivity growth was 0.5% on average. In the same period, the share of Italy in 
total world exports decreased from 4.5% to 2.9%; see ROSSI, 2006.  
7 A comprehensive analysis of industrial districts is provided by BECATTINI et al., 2009. On the geography of Italian 
industrial districts, see SFORZI, 2002. 
8 Several authors argue that the gains in productivity associated with ICT investment are conditional on micro-
complementarities among ICT adoption, internal reorganization processes and high levels of human capital (see 
BRYNJOLFSSON and HITT, 2000; BRESNAHAN et al., 2002; FALK, 2002; HUR et al., 2005 and, with specific 
reference to Italy, TRENTO and WARGLIEN, 2003, BUGAMELLI and PAGANO, 2004, LUCCHETTI and 
STERLACCHINI, 2004).  
9 Mezzogiorno is used to describe the South of the country; in the literature it refers to the mainland regions of Abruzzo, 
Molise, Campania, Basilicata, Apulia and Calabria plus the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. 
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10 Other possible effects of outsourcing have been investigated as well. There has been for example an intense 
discussion on the impact on wage and employment; see HEGGER and KREICKEMEIER, 2008 and KOHLER, 2009.  
11 GEREFFI and KORZENIEWICZ, 1994 use the term “global commodity chain”, rather than global value chain. The 
word “commodity” implies the production of undifferentiated products in processes with low barriers to entry, whereas, 
according to KAPLINSKY, 2000, page 9, “the search for sustainable income growth requires producers to position 
themselves precisely in non-commodity, high barriers to entry activities in the value chain”. HUMPHREY and 
SCHMITZ, 2002 highlight that Gereffi and other researchers agreed at a workshop held in Bellagio (Italy) in September 
2000, to use the term global value chain to refer to the firms’ linkages in the global chain. 
12 HUMPHREY and SCHMITZ, 2002 suggest that four types of value chain relationships can be distinguished: arms’ 
length relations; networks; quasi hierarchy; hierarchy. Among others, GIULIANI et al., 2005 deal with the relationship 
between value chain governance and firm upgrading.  
13 Note, however, that some studies (e.g. GEROSKI, 1998) find poor correlation between performance indicators based 
on accounting measures and growth rates. 
14 Statistics in Tables 1 to 4 are calculated on CAPITALIA, 1998, 2001 data; Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the 
econometric estimations carried out using data from the same sources. Where necessary, data are deflated by the ISTAT 
price index NIC.  
15 The same conclusions hold if we consider median growth rates (in parentheses in Tables 1 and 2). Especially for 
employees’ growth (Table 1), median values are considerably lower than mean values, indicating that high average 
growth rates are presumably due to a relatively low number of firms growing very quickly.  
16 Following the method suggested by ZIVOT and WANG, 2006, we regressed the variable presumably affected by 
endogeneity SUB on instruments and other explanatory variables, to test the joint statistical significance of the 
instruments. 
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Table 1 – Employees 
Panel A – Size distribution (number of observations) 
Employees 11-50 51-100 101-250 251-500 Over 500 
Centre-North 5588 991 621 425 306 
Mezzogiorno 880 180 115 35 22 
NOSUB 2524 534 368 235 186 
LOSUB 625 114 91 51 43 
HISUB 621 94 66 36 19 
ONSUB 2666 425 206 119 70 
Panel B – Average yearly growth rates. Mean and median (in parentheses) values 
 NOSUB LOSUB HISUB ONSUB Overall 
11-50 employees 19.14 (9.09) 
23.98 
(11.11) 
9.80 
(5.19) 
9.40 
(2.27) 
14.67 
(7.98) 
51-100 employees 17.78 (8.62) 
32.30 
(23.43) 
11.11 
(10.42) 
9.41 
(7.27) 
15.61 
(8.76) 
101-250 employees 17.24 (12.22) 
28.17 
(20.00) 
9.17 
(4.94) 
9.49 
(4.73) 
15.69 
(9.93) 
251-500 employees  13.32 (10.30) 
13.83 
(9.17) 
15.01 
(4.38) 
8.76 
(3.23) 
12.29 
(6.71) 
Over 500 employees  19.74 (16.65) 
19.53 
(23.13) 
14.87 
(8.68) 
9.22 
(0.83) 
17.10 
(10.60) 
Centre-North 18.80 (9.61) 
25.82 
(18.14) 
10.30 
(7.56) 
9.55 
(2.52) 
14.97 
(9.19) 
Mezzogiorno 17.73 (14.19) 
13.81 
(5.88) 
8.87 
(3.51) 
8.45 
(1.61) 
12.04 
(6.14) 
Overall 18.44 (9.72) 
24.65 
(13.26) 
10.24 
(5.63) 
9.38 
(2.40) 
14.84 
(7.84) 
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Table 2 – Real sales  
Panel A – Size distribution (number of observations) 
Billions Liras 
(prices of year 2000) Up to 10 10 to 50  50 to 200 200 to 500 Over 500 
Centre-North 4400 2473 743 198 87 
Mezzogiorno 766 373 68 14 12 
NOSUB 1911 1302 450 122 56 
LOSUB 490 310 82 29 12 
HISUB 491 261 58 16 6 
ONSUB 2251 959 202 36 22 
Panel B – Average yearly growth rates. Mean and median (in parentheses) values 
 NOSUB LOSUB HISUB ONSUB Overall 
11-50 employees 4.82 (3.04) 
4.36 
(2.90) 
7.86 
(5.10) 
5.91 
(3.05) 
5.52 
(3.04) 
51-100 employees -1.36 (0.60) 
1.83 
(1.16) 
2.38 
(1.38) 
6.13 
(3.12) 
1.98 
(1.45) 
101-250 employees 4.92 (3.99) 
5.54 
(3.86) 
7.23 
(5.02) 
5.80 
(3.75) 
5.45 
(3.80) 
251-500 employees  3.66 (3.14) 
4.57 
(3.03) 
6.83 
(4.44) 
5.42 
(3.88) 
4.50 
(3.21) 
>500 employees 5.06 (4.00) 
9.19 
(6.41) 
6.53 
(0.30) 
5.32 
(3.83) 
5.76 
(3.83) 
Centre-North 3.77 (2.71) 
4.28 
(2.30) 
7.23 
(4.14) 
5.86 
(3.40) 
5.50 
(3.03) 
Mezzogiorno 7.24 (3.29) 
6.53 
(2.70) 
0.15 
(1.08) 
4.02 
(0.90) 
5.22 
(1.76) 
Overall 3.91 (2.87) 
4.40 
(2.54) 
7.12 
(4.53) 
5.90 
(3.20) 
5.02 
(3.01) 
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Table 3 – ANOVA tests of mean equality (t and F values) 
Panel A – Growth of employees 
 NOSUB LOSUB HISUB ONSUB 
NOSUB  –     
LOSUB 7.216*** 52.069*** –   
HISUB 16.256*** 264.249*** 
8.380*** 
70.224*** –  
ONSUB 29.075*** 845.331*** 
11.933*** 
142.387*** 
0.174 
0.030 – 
Test on mean equality over all groups: F=318.641*** 
Panel B – Growth of real sales 
 NOSUB LOSUB HISUB ONSUB 
NOSUB  –     
LOSUB 0.086 0.007 –   
HISUB 3.873*** 14.997*** 
2.989*** 
8.936*** –  
ONSUB 5.109*** 26.105*** 
3.059*** 
9.359*** 
3.537*** 
12.289*** – 
Test on mean equality over all groups: F=11.709*** 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics 
 Description Obs Mean Max Min SD 
EMP Number of employees 9163 103.85 12630 11 369.18 
AGE Age of firm (in years) 9115 23.57 182 0 18.03 
AVK Ratio added value / invested capital 7713 0.04 2.58 -0.18 0.06 
AVL Ratio added value / number of employed* 7721 24.95 550.88 -35.62 29.90 
EXP Dummy. Takes value 1 if the firm exports 9134 0.69 1 0 0.46 
SAL Real value of sales** 9134 41.30 8645.71 0 221.3 
HUM 
Share of workers with a with a secondary 
school degree 8149 0.40 1 0 0.26 
ICT Dummy. Takes value 1 if the firm makes ICT investments 8501 0.78 1 0 0.41 
INP Dummy. Takes value 1 if the firm makes product innovation 9174 0.19 1 0 0.40 
ROI Value of ROI 7721 0.20 5.52 -4.58 0.71 
SUB Share of subcontracting on sales  9107 0.48 1 0 0.47 
SOU Dummy. Takes value 1 if the firm is localized in a Southern region 9177 0.13 1 0 0.34 
The number of observations for each estimation changes due to the different number of valid answers 
to the questionnaire. * values expressed in million liras; ** values in billion liras; values at prices of 
year 2000. 
 
 35
 
Table 5 – The determinants of growth rates (real sales) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS GIV OLS GIV OLS GIV 
Log SAL -0.0057** (0.0020) 
-0.0205** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0057** 
(0.0020) 
-0.0408*** 
(0.0131) 
-0.3420** 
(0.1670) 
-0.0267*** 
(0.0049) 
∆SALt-1 3.92E-06 (2.86E-06) 
4.61E-06 
(3.12E-06) 
3.92E-06 
(2.86E-06) 
4.85E-06 
(12.9E-06) 
-5.86E-05 
(5.01E-05) 
8.08E-06 
(9.01E-06) 
Log AGE -0.0438*** (0.0087) 
-0.0474*** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0438*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0113 
(0.0513) 
-0.0455** 
(0.0177) 
-0.0377*** 
(0.0074) 
SOU 0.0148 (0.0177) 
0.0075 
(0.0237) 
0.0148 
(0.0177) 
-0.0252* 
(0.0136) 
-0.09010 
(0.5230) 
0.1215 
(0.4209) 
SUB 0.0026 (0.0104) 
0.0098 
(0.0123) 
0.0019 
(0.0121) 
0.0017 
(0.0208) 
3.6336** 
(1.5141) 
2.6492*** 
(0.8710) 
SUB2 – – – – -3.5408** (1.4119) 
-2.5768*** 
(0.8484) 
SXS – – – – -4.6440** (2.2994) 
-2.9665*** 
(0.8841) 
SXS2 – – – – 4.0087** (1.7570) 
2.7327*** 
(0.8671) 
AVK -4.88E-05 (10.4E-05) 
-3.18E-04 
(3.30E-04) 
-4.90E-05 
(10.4E-05) 
-2.25E-04 
(2.32E-04) 
0.0013* 
(6.81E-04) 
3.66E-04** 
(1.78E-04) 
ICT 0.0421*** (0.0101) 
0.0494*** 
(0.0157) 
0.0421*** 
(0.0101) 
0.0337** 
(0.0169) 
0.2161** 
(0.0099) 
0.0291* 
(0.0151) 
INP -3.66E-04 (0.0108) 
-0.0078 
(0.0136) 
-0.0018 
(0.0168) 
-0.0688 
(0.1078) 
0.1451 
(0.1108) 
-0.0076 
(0.0135) 
IXS – – 0.0378** (0.0190) 
0.1970** 
(0.0866) – – 
Constant 0.2455*** (0.0517) 
0.0205*** 
(0.0078) 
0.2458*** 
(0.0517) 
0.4582** 
(0.2297) 
2.8972** 
(1.4201) 
0.1033 
(0.0683) 
Observations 7047 6919 7047 6919 7047 6917 
R2 0.0964 – 0.0965 – 0.2521 – 
Marginal effect 
CN  – – – – 0.3052 0.2248 
Marginal effect  
SOU – – – – -0.5706 -0.1764 
Turning point  
CN – – – – 0.5131 0.5145 
Turning point 
SOU – – – – 1.0797 1.0678 
OIR test – 3.3498 – 4.0073 – 4.3923 
OIR test on validity of overidentifying restrictions is carried out by the Newey and West, 1987 statistic, which 
distributes like a 2χ  with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of instruments 
(included exogenous variables) and the number of parameters to be estimated. 
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Table 6 – The determinants of growth rates (employees) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS GIV OLS GIV OLS GIV 
Log EMP -0.1499*** (0.0240) 
-0.1606*** 
(0.0250) 
-0.1501*** 
(0.0240) 
-0.1974*** 
(0.0546) 
-0.1508*** 
(0.0240) 
-0.1450*** 
(0.0271) 
∆EMPt-1 -0.8742*** (0.3197) 
-0.8013** 
(0.3173) 
-0.8744*** 
(0.3199) 
-1.1202*** 
(0.1496) 
-0.8738*** 
(0.3202) 
-0.9144*** 
(0.3482) 
Log AGE -0.0177 (0.0137) 
-0.0295* 
(0.0176) 
-0.0179 
(0.0137) 
-0.0400 
(0.0612) 
-0.0162 
(0.0138) 
-0.0148 
(0.0250) 
SOU 0.0640 (0.0490) 
0.0365 
(0.0659) 
0.0643 
(0.0492) 
0.0625 
(0.1115) 
0.0416 
(0.0480) 
0.0707 
(0.1579) 
SUB 0.0228 (0.0546) 
0.0404 
(0.0339) 
0.0226 
(0.0418) 
0.0390 
(0.1341) 
0.2018* 
(0.1133) 
16.4096*** 
(3.7725) 
SUB2 – – – – -0.1935* (0.1054) 
-16.0162*** 
(3.6694) 
SXS – – – – -0.3429* (0.1943) 
-16.6609*** 
(3.7292) 
SXS2 – – – – 0.2514* (0.1382) 
16.1412*** 
(3.6551) 
AVK 0.0043*** (0.0009) 
0.0033*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0043*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0052*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0043*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0068*** 
(0.0013) 
ICT 0.1262*** (0.0233) 
0.1477*** 
(0.0254) 
0.1173*** 
(0.0236) 
0.1731** 
(0.0877) 
0.1239*** 
(0.0227) 
0.0312 
(0.0463) 
INP 0.0995** (0.0399) 
0.0792* 
(0.0427) 
0.0558 
(0.0583) 
-0.1424 
(0.2508) 
0.0982** 
(0.0400) 
0.0334 
(0.0494) 
IXS – – 0.5302*** (0.0675) 
0.4384* 
(0.2562) 
– – 
Constant 0.5439*** (0.0807) 
0.8394*** 
(0.2774) 
0.5517*** 
(0.0779) 
0.6408 
(0.7507) 
0.5446*** 
(0.0794) 
-0.2420 
(0.1928) 
Observations 7015 6889 7015 6889 7015 6889 
R2 0.1994 – 0.1995 – 0.1999 – 
Marginal effect 
CN  – – – – 0.0199 1.3544 
Marginal effect  
SOU – – – – -0.0867 -0.1372 
Turning point  
CN – – – – 0.5214 0.5123 
Turning point 
SOU – – – – 1.2185 1.0052 
OIR test – 4.6366 – 1.2004 – 1.2262 
OIR test on validity of overidentifying restrictions is carried out by the Newey and West, 1987 statistic, which 
distributes like a 2χ  with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of instruments 
(included exogenous variables) and the number of parameters to be estimated. 
 
 
